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Abstract
We propose a model of growth driven by the co-evolution of institutions
and technology. To be consistent with Douglass North (1990, 1991, 1994),
institutions are dened as a type of collective knowledge about a specic
environment that can prescribe how to adapt general technology before
the latter can be actually used. Institutions, then, are treated as a factor
in the innovation process, and as such can be purposely accumulated. The
simultaneous accumulation of institutions and technology are modeled as
an evolutionary game whereby boundedly-rational rms choose how much
to allocate to institutional spendingvis-a-vis research expenditures, in
anticipation of changes in monopoly prots from technological innovation.
Using Taylor and Jonkers (1978) Replicator Dynamics to describe the
evolution of such strategies, we are able to show how this transition process
converges to the steady state model of Romer (1990).
Keywords: endogenous growth, institutions, technological change
JEL: O30, O33, O49, P48, Z13
1 Introduction
This paper analyses economic growth, generally, as the consequence of learning,
and specically, as the result of institutional and technological change. While
the notion of knowledge-driven growth (a la Arrow (1962)) may now be common-
place, we identify both institutions and technology as the types of knowledge
that matter, and in modeling their evolution, we attempt to reconcile various
strands of the growth literature.
One strand, of course, attributes growth to technology. Taking the neo-
classical view, (historically large) Solow growth residuals can be explained by
exogenous improvements in total factor productivity. And with the seminal
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papers of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), one may now fully
account for persistent growth by endogenising technological change. This is
not to say that endogenous growth theory itself is not wrought with problems.
While technology has now been established as the engineof long-run growth,
inconsistencies still abound. An important question is why the neoclassical
growth model seems to be adequate in describing economic performance and
cross-country convergence when institutional factors are taken into account.1
And more generally, why do institutions seem to matter greatly?2
The new institutional economics approach to historical economic perfor-
mance, i.e. Douglass North (1990, 1991, 1994), Davis and North (1991), and
North and Thomas (1973), may thus provide a better framework for analysing
growth. Yet in spite of the vast empirical literature, Sala-i-Martin (2002) ac-
knowledges that we are still in the early stages when it comes to incorporating
institutions to our growth theories.As expected, there can be numerous ap-
proaches to modeling institutional change and growth. First of all, there are
many ways of formally dening institutions. Adhering to North, one can re-
late institutions to transaction costs faced by economic agents, but it is also
possible to describe institutions as the overall incentive structure that governs
the economy. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996),
Vega-Redondo (1993) and Aumann and Kurz (1977), for instance, envisage in-
stitutional change as a process whereby the distribution of wealth, or income,
is determined.
Secondly, since existing growth models vary, the way in which we depict
institutional change may well depend on the specic model we use. Hall and
Jones (1999) consider the neoclassical model and argue that institutions (or
the social infrastructure) a¤ect the productivity of all inputs, while endoge-
nous growth theory may focus on the impact of institutions on the innovation
process, as in Kower (2002). Note, however, that while Kower models (nancial)
institutional change within the Aghion and Howitt quality-ladder framework, a
di¤erent specication may apply if we treat technological change as horizontal
innovations.3
Is it institutional development, then, or is it technological change, that drives
long-run economic performance? This paper asserts that insofar as knowledge
1On the other hand, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) signicantly improves the explana-
tory power of the neoclassical model by adding human capital as a factor of production, and
as shown by Glaeser, et. al. (2004), it may be human capital, and not institutions per se, that
cause growth. Interestingly, it may all depend on how one denes, and proxies for, human
capital. Note that inasmuch as Lucas (1988) treats human capital as a non-rival good, one
may argue that human capital may be equivalent to knowledge/technology, and growth may
still ultimately be caused by this.
2There is a large empirical literature on the e¤ect of institutions on economic per-
formance. (Durlauf and Quah (1999) list over 80 notable papers. For an anno-
tated bibliography by the World Bank of the e¤ect of governance on development, see
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/annotatedbibliography.pdf.) Some
well-known studies include Sala-i-Martin (1997), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995),
Hall and Jones (1999), and more recently, Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2001), Easterly and Levine
(2003), and Rodrik et. al (2004).
3See, then, section 2 for such specication within the Romer model.
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is the prime determinant of growth, then technologies, in the form of research
and innovation, and institutions, corresponding to socialknowledge, both in-
uence growth and development. Although the recognition of institutions as
the product of social learning or a type of collectiveknowledge can already be
seen in North, inuential work by Nelson and Winter (1982) and, more recently,
Nelson (2002) which model growth as an evolutionary process treat institutions
as socialtechnologies or routines that develop through time as a result of the
combined forces of mutation, selection and inheritance.4
Nelson further argues for the co-evolution, or the interdependence of insti-
tutional and technological change, using as historical illustrations the two-way
causality between innovation and institutions in the rise of mass production
in the US and in the development of a science-based industry in Germany.5
North himself provides historical examples which show how institutional de-
velopments have increased incentives to production and innovation (as in the
industrial evolution, which was made possible because of the creation of insti-
tutions that protected intellectual property rights). But the causation need
not always have been unidirectional. For instance, North (1991) illustrates
how, throughout history, expansions of markets and long-distance trade (which
arguably have been made possible by underlying technological improvements)
have led to institutional developments to overcome transaction costs.
A comprehensive and unied treatment of economic growth would thus en-
tail modeling the co-evolution of institutions and technology. Vega-Redondo
(1993) develops such a model but which, although more formal than Nelson, is
too schematic. Instead, this paper o¤ers a more dened, empirically testable,
approach that endogenises institutional and technological change and traces cor-
responding growth rates during transition towards, and at, the steady state.6
Thus, in the next section, we take Romer as our point of departure and
analyse the steady state (where the quality, but not the quantity, of institu-
tions is treated as xed) and show that the balanced growth rate depends on
a constant rate of di¤usion and adaptation of technology, which in turn is in-
uenced by the quality of institutions. With perfectly e¤ective institutions, the
model reverts to the original results in Romer; otherwise, growth in the steady
state is relatively slower.
Section 3 provides the more novel and larger part of the paper in modeling
the transition dynamics along which institutional quality itself co-evolves with
technological quality. We show how shocks to the steady state trigger an
evolutionary game that generates an endogenous change in institutional and
technological quality. In doing so, we formalise the mechanism envisaged by
North in which institutions develop as an adaptive response to, and to reduce
the uncertainty in, the new climate.
We assume that, generally, the way relevant shocks a¤ect quality is by al-
4Dosi and Nelson (1994) provide a survey of evolutionary modeling in economics.
5Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) also recognise the mutual dependence of technological
and institutional change (also within an evolutionary framework).
6We do not (yet) provide empirical results here, but Desierto (2005) presents some hypo-
thetical simulations.
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tering the anticipated interest cost of the rm. The interest cost is here inter-
preted as the e¤ective cost of nancing a technological innovation, incorporating
all transaction costs faced by rms.7 We argue that when the shock can (still)
be anticipated, there can be some uncertainty in the aggregate economy as to
the correctinterest cost, and hence, uncertainty as to the level of prots that
can be maintained. This allows each rm to react to the shock by adopting
either of the following two anticipatory moves: it can spend on institutional
development, thereby creating external e¤ects for the whole economy - institu-
tions being public goods; or it can adjust the price of its own product, thereby
aiming to fully capture the excludable benets. As expected, the second alter-
native yields relatively higher prots. However, the rst alternative is a safer
option.8 This is because an increase (decrease) in a rms level of prots implies
a decrease (increase) in the wages it pays to its human capital. If the rms set
of human capital is perfectly mobile, it can move out of the rm if wages are
decreased, leaving the rm with zero prots. However, if human capital has
some uncertainty or adjustment costs, it cannot readily move out, and the rm
can capture the relatively higher prots at a lower wage. Choosing the rst
strategy, on the other hand, guarantees that the relatively lower prot is actu-
ally obtained, since in this case, human capital has no reason to move out of
the rm.
Within the context of evolutionary games, this uncertainty is translated into
the assumption of bounded rationality, which implies that rms and their human
capital cannot simultaneously predict each others preferred strategy on wages or
prots (nor the corresponding strategy on institutional spending and product
price). They instead play a coordination game, repeatedly and continuously,
until the corrector stablestrategy is learned in the aggregate, and the new
steady state is asymptotically reached. To describe such evolution of strategies,
we use Taylor and Jonkers (1978) Replicator Dynamics .
Finally, section 4 provides a brief intuitive interpretation of the proposed
co-evolutionary model of growth, while section 5 concludes.
2 The Steady State
For ease of exposition, we rst describe the steady state, i.e. the limit case to
which the transition dynamic in section 3 converges. It is straightforward to
adjust the Romer (1990) model in order to accommodate institutional change
if we explicitly dene institutions as a type of knowledge which is country, or
environment, specic.9 Romer denes knowledge as instructions for working
7Kower, also using Norths concept of institutional change, shows the link between trans-
action costs, nancial-sector development, and innovation. Our approach, however, is not
necessarily conned to nancial institutions.
8That is, the rst strategy is risk-dominantin a game-theoretic sense. See Harsanyi and
Selten (1988).
9"Institutions are the external mechanisms individuals create to structure and order the
environment" (North (1994)). Although Nelson (2002) dubs institutions as social technolo-
gies, we make a more explicit specication in conning these technologies to specic countries
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with raw materials. In the same manner, we could argue that institutions, as
long as they are humanly devised constraints that structure human interac-
tion(North 1994), could be thought of as sets of instructions that, when used
in the production of technology, would help prescribe the production process.
The extent of their relevance in technology-creation could be captured by a
parameter that describes the quality, or level of e¤ectiveness, of institutions.
Norths concept of institutions can then be incorporated in the Romer model
if we specify that each blueprint (which represents a particular technology) has
a portion of knowledge, or instructions, that is general and a portion that is
(country) specic. The latter would be of importance whenever the (country-
specic) environment is relevant to technology creation. The environment in this
case could be thought of as an additional raw materialthat might be relevant
because the technology might need to be adapted to the environment before it
could be used. Hence, given a specic environment, each blueprint might need
to have not only a portion allocated to generalproduction instructions, but
also to the adaptation process, which we dub specicknowledge.
To describe the evolution of technology, A, in the steady state, we modify
the Romer model as follows:
_A = HAI
A1 g ; 0    1; (1)
where HA is human capital employed in research,  is a xed productivity
parameter, Agis general knowledge, I is institutions dened by I = AsE , and As
is the specic knowledge about the corresponding specic environment E > 1.
Therefore, we can rewrite (1) as _A = HA
 
As
E

A1 g =
HAA
E , since, within
that particular environment, all knowledge is shared or di¤used, i.e. As = Ag.10
In another paper (see ch. 4 of Desierto (2005)), we have specically measured
E as the volume of the (three-dimensional) geographical space in which all rms
are located. However, here we suggest that the conceptual denition of E may
include other exogenous variables that may a¤ect the di¤usion of technology,
so that E need not only refer to geography, but can also include the underlying
exogenous cultural, political and social environment.11 Such variables can refer
to what Davis and North (1971) dene as the institutional superstructure.
(Including this exogenous institutional climate may thus require an increase in
the dimension of locationof rms beyond three.)
The measurement of an economys aggregate E may also reect the intuition
that a more homogeneous environment is smaller.12 That is, a more uniform
or environments. This would be useful in an open economy setting, for we may now be able
to explain why not all knowledge can readily spill over across countries. (Desierto (2005)
provides an open-economy interpretation of the model.)
10 It is assumed that a country has one specic environment which all rms share, but
the analysis can easily accommodate heterogeneity within a country by treating particular
environments as separate economies.
11Although the extent of exogeneity and possible endogeneity may be a matter of contention,
language, religion, some norms and values, the constitution, and basic laws ingrained therein
such as property rights may arguably provide some examples.
12One could think that greater clustering ( in space and institutional environment) of rms
in an economy would translate to smaller aggregate E.
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permeation of the aggregate geography and institutional superstructure among
rms within the economy can probably be reected as smaller aggregate envi-
ronment E; in which it is inherently easier for a certain technology to be applied
and di¤used, all things being equal. Such a treatment could be made consistent
with the literature on the new economic geography and the spatial economy.13
A major di¤erence here is that space(geography and institutional superstruc-
ture) can be overcome by the value of . Particularly, with  = 0, it does
not matter at all how large or complex the environment is. It can be seen
in this case that the environment (and institutions I) would have no inuence
in the production of technology, and the model would revert to the original
Romer specication, i.e. _A = HAA, where the evolution of technology would
be relatively faster.14
We thus interpret  as the quality, or level of e¤ectiveness, of (the relevant
set of) institutions. Indeed, the parameter  could be interpreted as the factor
intensity of institutions I, or environment E, in knowledge creation. The lower 
is, the more e¤ective the current set of institutions would be, thereby rendering
further production of As, for adaptation of Ag, unnecessary. When  = 0, inno-
vations would be readily usable, and e¤ective institutions could be interpreted
as pure public goods that are completely non-excludable. Such perfectinstitu-
tions would already be subsumedin (the skills) of human capital inasmuch as
all human capital have full, equal access, to pure public institutions. Whenever
 > 0, there would still be relevant institutions that are not yet e¤ective or
purely public, which might then provide the incentive for further endogenous
accumulation of institutions by producing specic knowledge As (alongside gen-
eral knowledge Ag). Thus,  could capture the extent to which the adaptation
process (increases in As) could be excluded from every new blueprint that is
produced.
We can easily solve for the balanced growth rate as in Romer, while incorpo-
rating the role of institutions. However, instead of economy j being composed
of separate research, durable-good, and manufacturing sectors, we assume that
researchers are directly hired by the (durable good) rms, so that the price
of the blueprints that researchers produce is seen as an internal price.15 The
monopolistically-competitive rms produce durable goods according to the cor-
responding blueprints produced by their researchers, which are then supplied
to a single manufacturing sector that produces output according to a modied
Cobb-Douglas production function:16
13For a survey of the literature, see, for example, Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999)
and Ottaviano and Thisse (2003). Note that space in our model does not only refer to
geographical characteristics but to the institutional superstructure as well.
14Of course, it is possible to re-interpret Romers productivity parameter as  = 1
E
, al-
though in this case we would be disregarding other factors that could potentially a¤ect the
productivity parameter.
15Note that Romer mentions the possibility of using this alternative setup without a¤ecting
the results of the model. More importantly, it conveniently allows us to visualise the evo-
lutionary game in section 3 as a pair-wise game played between a durable-good rm and its
own set of researchers.
16We follow Romers notation wherever possible.
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Yj = H

YjL

j
Z Aj
0
xj (i)
1  
= HYjL

jAjx
1  
j ; (2)
where aggregate nal output, Yj , is produced by the total human capital em-
ployed in the manufacturing sector HYj , and labour Lj , from the entire set of
durable goods, each supplied at the level xj , the variety of which are determined
by the blueprints Aj that have already been produced by researchers.17 (With
Kj = Ajxj , that is, capital K equal to  units of foregone consumption needed
to produce the total durable goods required in production, output can also be
expressed as Yj =
 
HYjAj

(LjAj)

K1  j 
+ 1.) Recalling equation (1),
knowledge (measured as blueprints) is produced by researchers HAj according
to:
_Aj = HAjI

j A
1 
gj =
HAjAj
E
j
j
; (1a)
where 0    1, and I = AsE , so that _A = HA
 
As
E

A1 g =
HAA
E , since in a
closed economy all knowledge is di¤used, i.e. As = Ag.
All income in research goes to human capital researchers,HAj , however, their
wage rate, WHAj , is now limited by their environment, Ej , and the e¤ectiveness
of institutions, j . That is,
WHAj =
PAjAj
E
j
j
; (3)
where PAj is the price of the blueprint.
The demand of the nal output sector for durable goods is obtained by
maximizing prot conditional on xj , after the scale of operation and the levels
of Lj and HYj have been determined, implying:
pj (i) = (1    )HYjLj xj (i)   : (4)
Note that the durable-good sector is monopolistically competitive.18 Each
rm incurs a xed cost for the blueprint and obtains a monopoly over its use in
durable-good production.19 It chooses the level of xj that maximizes revenue,
pj (xj) xj , minus variable cost, rjxj , where rj is the interest rate, and xj are
the total units of output (or foregone consumption) used in the production of
durable goods. By use of equation (4), the monopoly-pricing problem reduces
to:
17Although this paper strictly pertains to a closed economy, for tractability, we assume that
some values would be the same across economies in an open economy framework (see Desierto
(2005)), and thus for these parameters we omit the subscript j.
18Although rms earn a stream of (positive) prots, with free entry, rms earn zero prot
in a present value sense. (Romer 1990). That is, the present value of the stream of prots
goes to the purchase of blueprints. See equation (8).
19 Its monopoly is only in terms of production. Knowledge is non-rival, so that it can be
used universally in research, but non-owners of the blueprint are excluded from using it to
produce the corresponding durable good (Romer 1990).
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j = max
xj
p (xj)xj   rjxj = max
xj
(1    )HYjLj xj (i)1     rjxj : (5)
The price of durable goods is thus a mark-up over marginal cost:
pj =
rj
1     ; (6)
which, when substituted into the demand equation (4) can solve for the level of
durable goods supplied to the nal goods sector:20
xj =
"
(1    )2HYjLj
rj
# 1
+
: (7)
Equilibrium prot is thus j = (+ ) pjxj . The xed cost of the blueprint
incurred by the durable goods rm is recouped through a stream of rental pay-
ments from the nal output sector. Thus, the price of the blueprint, PAj , is bid
up by durable goods producers until it equals the present value of durable-good
sector prots, jrj = PAj , so that:
PAj =
(+ ) pjxj
rj
=
(+ ) (1    )HYjLj x1  j
rj
: (8)
Since human capital is employed either in research or in manufacturing,
Hj = HYj +HAj , the wage rate of researchers equals the marginal productivity
of human capital in the nal output sector:
PAjAj
E
j
j
= H 1Yj L

jAjx
1  
j : (9)
Using equations (8) and (9), we can thus solve for the level of human capital
in manufacturing:
HYj =
E
j
j rj
 (1    ) (+ ) : (10)
To close the model, Romer uses the following consumersintertemporal util-
ity function with constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1 :Z 1
0
U (C) e tdt; U (C) =
C1    1
1   ;  2 [0;1) ; (11)
20Because of the symmetry in the model, all the durable goods that are available are
supplied at the same level (henceforth denoted as x). If they were not, it would be possible
to increase prots in the producer durable sector by reducing the output of high-output rms
and diverting capital released in this way to low-output goods (Romer 1990). While in the
steady state, the level x is the same for all rms, the transition dynamics in section 3 makes
explicit the process of adjustment towards a single level of x and the equalization of prots of
all rms.
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with  as the preference parameter. With a xed rj , the optimizing condi-
tion for consumers is thus:
_Cj
Cj
=
rj   

: (12)
With HYj , Lj and xj xed in the steady state, it can be seen from equation
(2) that output Yj would have to be growing at the same rate as knowledge,
equal to
_Aj
Aj
. Capital Kj also grows at the same rate as Yj , since  and xj are
xed, and with KjYj constant, consumption grows at the same rate as capital.
21
Thus, in equilibrium, all the variables grow at a constant exponential rate:22
_Kj
Kj
=
_Yj
Yj
=
_Cj
Cj
=
_Aj
Aj
=
HAj
E
j
j
: (13)
Given the constraint Hj = HYj +HAj ;and using equation (10), the growth
rate, gj =
HAj
E
j
j
;is thus equal to:
gj =
Hj
E
j
j
  rj ;where  = 
(1    ) (+ ) ; (14)
which, with equation (12), can be expressed in terms of the economys funda-
mentals:
gj =
 
Hj
E
j
j
  
!
1
 + 1

: (15)
Equations (14) and (15) are the counterparts of the equilibrium growth rate
in the Romer model when the latter is adjusted for the e¤ect of the environment
E and the e¤ectiveness  of institutions.23 Note that in limit case where institu-
tions are perfectly e¤ective, i.e.  = 0, the economy grows according to Romers
model, but whenever  > 0 growth is relatively smaller. The exogenously given
E and steady-state level  > 0 act to limit the productivity of human capital
in research, and thus can curtail the otherwise larger growth rate implied in
Romer.
Additional insight on the role of institutions can be gained by studying the
expression for equilibrium wages of human capital (derived as equation (3)), i.e.
WHA =
PAA
E
;
21Capital is accumulated as foregone output: _K (t) = Y (t)   C (t). Thus, C
Y
= 1   _K
Y
=
1  _K
K

K
Y

.
22They grow exponentially since A is linear in A, and at a constant rate since HA stays
constant in equilibrium (Romer 1990).
23 In Romers model, g = H   r and in terms of fundamentals, g = H 
+1
.
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where PA is the price of the innovation, equal to the present value prot rj . The
expression above implies that with a higher ; wages of HA are lower. Following
Hall and Jones (1999), this suggests that with less e¤ective institutions (higher
), the foregone wage of human capital is spent on diversion activities to capture
the (entire) prot from A, instead of producing only general technology.
Thus, the entire institutional e¤ect, can be formally captured by
 
As
E

.
Such a denition can encompass a wide range of institutions, both formal and
informal. Financial institutions, governance including laws and courts (espe-
cially patent laws and enforcement), cultural traits (including language), and
informal organisations that embody social capital have all been believed to a¤ect
growth.24 Since institutional factors can potentially a¤ect the whole process of
technology production and di¤usion, from making available existing knowledge
for further research up to producing the corresponding durable sector for use in
the nal output sector, there can thus be some motivation for deliberate insti-
tutional spendingby rms. That is, rms can spend not only on research, but
also on lobbying, litigation, organizational changes, the development of nan-
cial instruments and accounting techniques, and even advertisement, all of which
help change the existing body of formal and informal institutions in the hope
of maximizing the prots that can be obtained from technological innovation.
Think of an economy that starts from a steady state in which  is xed.
That is, the amount of e¤ortspent by rms towards institutional change (vis-
à-vis towards generalknowledge production) is just enough to keep the level
of aggregate institutional quality. Additions to the current body of institutions,
in the form of As, have to be made by the rm if it wants to produce a par-
ticular blueprint, but it does so by spending, or divertingfrom human capital
wages, an amount dictated by the xed . Note that although the set of in-
stitutions becomes larger or complex with each new technology that is created,
the aggregate qualityof institutions remains the same, thereby keeping prot
and productivity of all other rms una¤ected. That is, the di¤erence between
additions to As and possible changes in  is that the latter a¤ects the prots
of all rms, while the e¤ects of the former apply only to a particular rm or
technology.25
In the next section, we see how  evolves to approach its steady state level,
but before proceeding to the transition dynamics, note that while As and 
24For recent surveys and studies, see, for instance, Kower (2002) on the role of nancial
development, and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) on social capital. Mauro (1995) and Hall
and Jones (1999) use political indicators, with the latter also including geographical and cul-
tural variables. Sala-i-Martin (1997) runs regressions on combinations of various institutional
factors. Boulhol (2004) uses a new institutional database developed by the French Ministry
of Economy, Finance and Industry that covers 115 indicators.
25For instance, software rms might push for anti-piracy laws, but this bears no direct
relevance to the biotech industry; or the latter can spend on advertising to inuence public
attitude towards genetic cloning, but this has no use for the IT industry. Such e¤orts add
on to the existing body of institutions (laws and culture, in this instance) without inuenc-
ing aggregate institutional quality. That is, each innovation increases the aggregate cost
of institutions, albeit the percentage of institutional spending per innovation remains xed.
Section 3 considers institutional changes that have wider-reaching e¤ects by allowing  to
evolve endogenously.
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may evolve endogenously, E is exogenous, i.e., outside of rmsscope of inu-
ence.26 Shocks to E are always unanticipated. If a shock can be anticipated,
then arguably, rms can treat them as anticipated changes in the interest rate,
and can thus initiate changes in  to (at least) keep prots from decreasing.27
That is, a transitional dynamic can be triggered, in which the interest rate and
institutional quality are the variables that evolve, rather than the environment.
3 Transition Dynamics
We can note from equation (4) in the preceding section that durable-good rms
share the same demand from the nal-output sector. Since these rms also face
the same interest cost, they earn the same level of durable-good rm prots, and
supply the same level of durable good, x. Also, given the same r, E, and HY ,
faced by all rms and both sectors (manufacturing and durable-good/research),
it must follow that  is xed, so that wages within and across sectors remain
equal. In the transitional dynamics we are about to discuss here, we are not
only able to characterise the evolution of the interest rate cost, r (and hence the
level of durable goods, x) towards its equilibrium value, but we are also able to
show the simultaneous evolution of  towards its steady state level. Anticipated
changes in the interest cost are treated as shocks that trigger the endogenous
evolution of  in which the adoption of a particular strategy for  reveals the true
transaction cost and hence, the stable level of prots, which in turn determines
the stable strategy for . The Replicator Dynamics (RD) in section 3.2 describe
such adjustments in the level of institutional quality, and transaction costs and
prots, as rms start preparing for the anticipated change in the interest cost.
The framework is based on the strategic behaviour of boundedly-rational rms
that continuously play a (evolutionary) game to eventually determine the stable
level of , the structure of which is outlined in the following section 3.1.
3.1 Strategic Behaviour
From equations (8) and (9), we can obtain a function for  that equates the
marginal productivity of HYj with the wage rate of HAj :
j =
log

 (+ ) (1    )HYj
  logrj
logEj
: (16)
At the steady state,  is a convention.28 A relevant shock to the steady
state, which can change the interest cost r, may make  unstable and thus
evolve potentially to another level. However, this does not necessarily provide a
26E, like , is xed in the steady state, but while  may evolve out of the steady state, E
is always treated here as an exogenous variable.
27See section 3.
28Young (1993) denes a convention as a pattern of behaviour that is customary, expected
and self-enforcing. A convention is evolutionarily stable. Thus, the steady state , being a
xed level, is evolutionarily stable.
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motivation for a change in . It can be seen from equation (16) that for a given
Ej , a change in rj can lead to a change in j only if HYj does not change to the
extent of fully o¤setting the change in rj . An exogenous decrease in rj , at the
current level of prots, increases PAj , which increases the income per blueprint
of researchers (provided  does not increase to o¤set it), and thus prompts a
movement of human capital from manufacturing to research. The new level of
HYj can be easily computed from equation (10) by replacing rj with a new level.
However, if HYj is to remain xed, given a change in r, then j can change, but
for this to happen adjustment costs that hamper the mobility of human capital
must be in place.
Before dening the particular assumptions on mobility, note that there is a
crucial strategic element that comes from assuming that there is a xed total
amount of human capital that is allocated between sectors, i.e. Hj = HYj+HAj ,
and a xed amount per rm in the durable-good sector, i.e. HAi =
HAj
Nj
, where
Nj is the number of rms in the economy. The prots that each rm actually
obtains not only depends on the demand it faces (which depends on HYj ), but is
also contingent on its staying operativeor, equivalently, since a rm undertakes
both research and durable-good production, on whether or not it can maintain
its HAi =
HAj
Nj
.29 Thus, since the level of  that each rm chooses a¤ects the
wage it pays to its own researchers, the choice of  potentially prompts some
(inter and intra-sector) movement of human capital, which ultimately a¤ects
the prots that the rm actually obtains. However, due to the assumption
of bounded rationality, individual rms cannot know beforehand other rms
strategies for  (and hence their wage) and, thus, cannot predict the exact
extent of human capital mobility. Therefore, rms play a continuous game to
eventually learnthe correctstrategy for  and a wage that reects the true
marginal productivity of human capital, i.e., the strategy that prevents further
movement of human capital.
3.1.1 Assumptions
We now clarify the assumptions upon which the payo¤s of the game are based.
First, in this out-of-steady-state version of the model, there is asymmetry in
the mobility of human capital based on heterogeneous adjustment costs. Par-
ticularly, we assume that inter-sector relocation of human capital is more costly
than intra-sector movement. This may be indicative of some inherent dif-
ferences between the skills required in manufacturing and in the durable-good
sector, highlighted during periods of transition, which make HY and HA imper-
fect substitutes. For instance, HY could pertain to high-level managerial skills,
rather than to innovation performed by scientists and engineers.
29 In this setup where the researchers are explicitly employed in the durable-good rm, it is
now as if the patent for the blueprint is owned by its researchers. That is, the rm pays itself
the value of the blueprint (and hence, uses an internal price PA) to be able to produce the
corresponding durable good. If the rm loses its researchers, it loses its patent, or its right to
produce the durable good and hence the prots associated with it.
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Thus, suppose for a given maximum wage wmax and a minimum wage wmin,
HY can start moving into research (and/or HAi can move into manufacturing)
only if it can obtain w > wmax, while HAi can immediately and completely
move out of its current rm to another research/durable-good rm if it can
earn w > wmin. There may be heterogeneity among rms as well, so that
by moving out of its current rm but still staying in research, HAi can earn
potentially any amount from the range (wmin; wmax]. This heterogeneity in the
research/durable good sector is not responsible for triggering the dynamics per
se, but what is essential is that the cost of inter-sector movement is greater than
wmax, while the cost of intra-sector relocation is at most wmax.30
Within this framework, the relevant shocks that can initiate the dynamics
can thus be anticipated, thereby allowing rms to preparefor any impending
change in the interest cost by adjusting the level of , ahead of any response
from the manufacturing sector in the form of inter-sectoral movement of human
capital.31
The next two assumptions - bounded rationality and a large number of rms-
are to some extent related to the assumed asymmetry of human capital mobil-
ity. Bounded rationality is captured by the feature that rms cannot predict
whether, and/or by how much, all other playersrespond to the shock which, in
e¤ect, reects some uncertainty as to the correctstrategy for . This assump-
tion can be justied if there is asymmetry of adjustment costs or heterogeneity
of rms. If, instead, all rms were the same, then the correct strategy is easily
predicted. That is, if there were, rst of all, no inter-sector asymmetry, there
would be no opportunity for research/durable good rms to anticipateshocks
ahead of the manufacturing sector by changing  in response to a change in
r, but instead, HY decreases or increases to reect the new productivity of all
human capital. (Recall from equation 16 that the proportional adjustment of
r and HY preventschanges in .) Thus, in this case, it is as if the strategy
for  is easily predicted, i.e. as if there is no bounded rationality with respect
to this, inasmuch as  remains at the same level prior to the shock.
Secondly, if there were (strictly) no intra-sector asymmetry, but as long
as there is some inter-sector heterogeneity,  could still change, but in this
case, the new level of  could be easily predicted, or solved for, given the
new predictablelevel of HY . That is, if the entire research sector could predict
how HA, and consequently HY , would change, then this sector could play a one-
30 Intra-sector adjustments only inuence the speed of adjustment during transition. In
simulations performed in Desierto (2005), we illustrate that the more homogeneous the re-
search/durable sector, the faster the dynamics approach the steady state.
31A prime example of such a shock is integration to global/regional markets. Firms
have the opportunity of adjusting human capital productivity by changing  even before the
global/regional interest cost is adopted, i.e. while the domestic economy is still strictly closed,
if the rms anticipate eventual integration. See Desierto (2005a) for the specic model. Other
examples could be the threat of war or revolutions and impending political regime changes or
constitutional amendments. Strictly, what rms are anticipating is a change in interest rate,
so that even unanticipatedshocks, i.e. natural calamities and disasters, could translate into
an anticipated interest rate change. In this paper, however, we use the term anticipated
shockto mean anticipated interest rate change.
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shot game to determine the strategy for  that would reect the true di¤erence
in inter-sectoral human capital productivity. It is then as if there could be
no (or only very little) bounded rationality within the research/durable good
sector, which could weaken the justication for using a repeated and continuous
(evolutionary) game to model the evolution of . Thus, independent of the
assumption of human capital heterogeneity or asymmetry, which after all could
be due to some inherent di¤erences of human capital, we explicitly assume
bounded rationality across sectors and among research/durable good rms.32
Lastly, assuming a large population of rms reinforces the asymmetry in
the responses, and the associated bounded rationality, of rms, as it becomes
less plausible that the research/durable-good sector remains homogeneous, and
boundlesslyrational so as to be incapable of making mistakes, the larger the
number of rms within that sector.33 Taken together and applied to our partic-
ular model, these assumptions allow us to characterise the transition dynamics
as a repeated and continuous (evolutionary) game driven by uncertainty, and,
thus, as a learning process by which the steady state is eventually reached.
3.1.2 Evolutionary Game
The general evolutionary game used in the dynamics is characterised by rm-
players that are continuously and randomly drawnto play a pair-wise game,
whose strategies are particular values of  which yield associated payo¤s that
depend on the strategy of the rms random pair. The paircan be seen to
represent the strategy of a rm i, and the preferred strategy of its own human
capital, HAi , so that the game becomes a matching of strategies of the rm
with its current HAi .
34 Similarly, it could be interpreted as the matching of an
original strategy and a revised strategy, that is, the strategies that are adopted
before and after the true adjustment cost of HAi is known.
35 The pairing is
randomsince the true adjustment cost is not known at the time the original
strategy is implemented, i.e. the researchers (if they own the rm) may validate
the original strategy or revise it at random to reect their true adjustment cost.
Thus, at each (continuous) draw, it is as if a rm does not know with whom
it is paired.
From equation (3), it follows that, given the price of blueprints, a change in
 changes the wage that researchers obtain per blueprint.36 Suppose that there
32Bounded rationality as to the correct strategy for  necessarily implies, or is translated
into, some amount of heterogeneity of rms and human capital. Arguably, asymmetric
adjustment costs are not always attributable to, but can justify, bounded rationality.
33We also assume a large population in order to use the deterministic Replicator Dynamics
that relies on the law of large numbers in treating the average tness of strategies as expected
payo¤s. See Boylan (1992, 1995) for an analysis.
34Thus, if Nj is the actual number of rms, the number of (rm-)players is nj = 2Nj .
35This latter interpretation may be more useful if we explicitly assume that each rm is
owned by its researchers.
36Note that as researchers produce more blueprints, the income or wage per researcher
increases. Thus, wage rates of researchers, and the marginal productivity of HY increases
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are pre-determined values for the maximum and minimum wages per blueprint,
and that each strategy for  corresponds to a particular wage, then the following
game, which is based on the assumed asymmetric mobility of human capital,
illustrates the di¤erent alternatives that a rm might consider:
wmax w > wmax wmin < wmax
wmax min; min C ; C min; 0
w > wmax C ; C A; A B ; 0
wmin < wmax 0; min 0; B max; max
where A < B 7 C < min < max:
Given the interest cost r, the environment E, institutional quality , and
the level HY of human capital in manufacturing, we can obtain a reduced form
equation for rm prot by using equations (6), (7), and (10) and the fact that
equilibrium prots are j = (+ ) pjxj . That is,
 = r
2+ 1
+ (E)

+ ; (17)
where  = 

+ (1  )
2 2 
+ [L(+)]

+


+ 
1  
+
. We assume that  > 1 2 so that
the interest cost positively a¤ects prot.37
Thus, di¤erent levels of  (corresponding to di¤erent wages) can yield dif-
ferent levels of prot. Note, however, that wage strategies need not match or,
alternatively, original strategies may be (randomly) revised. That is, either the
rm can over-or-underestimate the productivity of its human capital or, in the
alternative scenario where the rm is owned by its researchers, the latter can
pre-commit to a level of productivity that they nd they cannot achieve. The
failure to match strategies may then lead to movement of human capital out
of its current rm and a re-organisation into a new rm (if productivity has
been underestimated), or attract additional human capital into the current rm
(if productivity has been overestimated). This has implications on the actual
prot that the rm obtains. Firstly, if any resulting transfer of human capital
involves inter-sector movement, the actual levels of HY may be di¤erent from
the pre-calculatedlevel used in the original formulation of equation (17) . Sec-
ondly, earning any level of prot in the rst place depends on whether or not
that particular rm remains operative, i.e. if it (still) has the blueprint neces-
sary to produce the durable good. Thus, the above game yields the same level
of prots for strategies that match since in this case there is no incentive for
human capital movement.
with A even at the steady state. What prompts the movement of human capital is not the
change in wage rates per se, but the change in the wage rate or marginal productivity per
blueprint, which, ceteris paribus, changes when  changes.
37Subscript j has been ignored not only to lighten the notation but, more importantly, so
that equation (17) can easily be used to calculate alternative prot levels using di¤erent values
for the variables.
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The maximum wage wmax, when matched with itself, yields the correspond-
ing prot minimum, min, while the pair (wmin; wmin) yields max. From equa-
tions (3) and (17), note that wage per blueprint is negatively related to , while
prot is positively related to . A minimum can thus be associated with
wmax that can yield min, while a maximum can imply wmin that can obtain
max.
The ordering of payo¤s as A < B 7 C < min < max is based on the
assumed asymmetry of human capital. Generally, HY is relatively less mobile
than HA, but the latter tends to stay in research should it move out of its
present rm. Recall that HY can only start moving to the research sector when
a rm o¤ers w > wmax, while HAi moves completely out of its rm if it can
earn w > wmin. Of course, there is no need for HAi to move if it already earns
w > wmin in its current rm. In this case, HAi moves out if it can earn an even
higher wage.
Thus, if rm i is prepared to pay its HAi a level of wage per blueprint equal
to wmax, and the true productivity per blueprint of HAi is also wmax, then HY
does not move to the rm, nor does HAi move out of the rm. The rm earns
min, and the compatibleprot for HAi is also min. If both rm i and its
HAi adoptthe same strategy wmin, then HY and HAi also remain where they
are, and the symmetric payo¤ is max.
If a (symmetric) level w > wmax is adopted, then there is no reason for HAi
to move out of its rm. However, w > wmax can attract some HY to move into
the rm, which would lower the actual demand for, and prot from, durable
goods. The symmetric payo¤ for the rm and its HAi is thus A < min.
If rm i pays w < wmax, but the true productivity of its HAi is w > wmax,
then HAi moves completely out of the rm. The rm ceases to operate, that
is, it loses its patent for the blueprint, and hence its actual prot is zero. HAi
can thus (instantaneously) form another rm and earn positive prots, but
at w > wmax, this new rm can attract some HY into it, thereby decreasing
actual prot to B . Note, though, that some of the HAi might transfer to the
manufacturing sector, bringing with them the higher productivity w > wmax, so
that the decrease in HY might be partially o¤set and B > A. The point is
that some HAi tends to remain in research, so that in this case there is greater
potential movement from manufacturing to research than vice-versa. Thus, the
decrease in HY is not fully o¤set, implying B < min.
If rm i pays w > wmax but its HAi only demands wmax, then HAi need not
move out of the rm. Some HY could move into the rm, thereby decreasing
actual prot to C . However, the movement of HY can be partially curtailed,
since the discrepancy between what the rm originally wanted to pay, w > wmax,
and what HAi demands, wmax, can be exploited, so that the nal wage may not
be that much larger than wmax. Hence, the movement of HY into the rm is
limited, or less than the movement when wmax meetswmax. Thus, we (still)
have C < min, but C > A.38 It is as though a symmetric w > wmax sends
38C may be greater than, equal to, or less than, B , depending on how much the decrease
in HY is o¤set in either case.
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a clearer signal to HY to move into research, while a non-symmetric strategy
involving w > wmax creates some hesitation.39
3.1.3 Equilibrium Entrants
It can be easily seen that the strategy w > wmax is dominated, and that the two
pure Nash equilibrium (N.E.) strategies are the symmetric wmax and wmin. If,
following Swinkels (1992), we endow the players with some prior rationality, then
we can ex-ante disregard w > wmax and re-dene the game into a symmetric bi-
matrix with (pure) strategies wmax and wmin, thereby restricting the competing
pure strategies to (Nash) equilibrium entrants.40 That is, suppose rms face
the initial 3  3 game above, they can eliminate the strategy w > wmax, since,
being a dominated strategy, it cannot be evolutionarily stable in the evolutionary
game.41 Since (the symmetric) w > wmax is not even a Nash equilibrium, it
cannot be a best response to a post-entry environment of (1  ") adopting wmax
and " adopting w > wmax, nor in an environment of (1  ") adopting wmin and
" adopting w > wmax, where, assuming wmax and wmin are evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESS), some small proportion of mutants " adopting w > wmax
cannot successfully invade. This is because in a pureenvironment, w > wmax
already yields strictly lesser prots than wmin and wmax, i.e. A < min < max.
Thus, in any (mixed) post-entry environment where some small proportion of
rms enters with w > wmax while the rest adopt wmin, or if the rest adopt wmax,
the expected payo¤ would be greater than A.
Disregarding w > wmax ex ante, we can test the evolutionary stability of
the Nash equilibria against each other. The bi-matrix game has three N.E.: the
(symmetric) N.E., wmax and wmin, and a mixed-strategy wmax+(1  )wmin.
The associated payo¤ matrix is thus:
A =

min min
0 max

:
In section 3.2.1, we identify wmax and wmin by specifying the particular
values of . The specic bi-matrix games are in a sense deterministic, since
for every relevant shock and given specic values for r, E, and HY , we can
pre-calculate two specic values for  corresponding to wmax and wmin, and the
associated payo¤s min and max.42
39Technically, it is enough to assume C > A, and unnecessary to specify that B > A,
in order for the symmetric strategy w > wmax to be dominated. Intuitively, however, one
would expect B > A using the same logic justifying C > A, since a symmetric w > wmax
can send a clearer signal to attract HY than an asymmetric strategy involving w > wmax.
40That is, wmax or wmin can enter the environment, i.e. some rms may start adopting
these, and may successfully invade by eventually replacing the incumbent wage.
41Note that evolutionary stability is a renement of the Nash equilibrium. Friedman (1991)
summarizes the relationship among stable states: ESS  NE  FP , where FP is a xed
point.
42Although the value of the strategies are pre-determined, there is still some inherent ran-
domness in the decision process since players do not know each others simultaneous move
but can only rely on expected payo¤s when choosing their strategy. Boylan (1992, 1995)
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The payo¤matrix A describes a coordination game in which there are three
nash equilibria (the two pure strategies - min which gives wmax, and max
corresponding to wmin - and one mixed strategy). Following Weibull (1995), we
can normalize A to form a doubly-symmetric matrix A0:
A0 =

a1 0
0 a2

;
where a1 = a11   a22 and a2 = a22   a12. Given min and max, the mixed-
strategy N.E. is equal to m = min

a2
a1+a2

+ max

1  a2a1+a2

.43
Among these equilibria, the ESS should satisfy Maynard Smiths (1974) rst,
(a), and second-order, (b), conditions:44
u (y; x)  u (x; x)8y (a)
u (y; x) = u (x; x) =) u (y; y) < u (x; y)8y 6= x; (b)
where assuming x is the (pure or mixed) ESS, and y a (pure or mixed) mutant
strategy, then x does better against y than y does against itself. Hofbauer (1979)
shows that this is equivalent to having the post-entry payo¤ of x greater than
the post-entry payo¤ of y:45
u [x; "y + (1  ")x] > u [y; "y + (1  ")x] :
For ES strategies, there must then exist a minimum value of " > 0 which
can maintain the condition of strict inequality of expected payo¤s, and it can
be easily seen that only the two pure N.E. strategies are evolutionarily stable.
If, say, min is the incumbent ESS, for it to remain so when there is possi-
bility of mutation, it must be that the proportion of mutants adopting max
is small enough, i.e. " can take on values 0 < " < a2a1+a2 while keeping the
post-entry payo¤ of min strictly greater than that of max. If we allow the
proportion to evolve as v, any value a2a1+a2 < v < 1 reverses the inequality,
making max the new ESS.
46 Thus, both of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria
are ESS. However, the post-entry payo¤ of mixed strategy m is always equal
points out that by the law of large numbers it is as if players behave as expected. In Desierto
(2005b) we propose an explicitly stochastic model in which selection of strategies need not
follow expected payo¤s, although the value of the pure strategies may still be pre-determined.
That is, individual players may make mistakes in choosing between the given pure strategies.
43By normalization, Weibull (1995) shows that general symmetric 2x2 games can be cat-
egorized with respect to best-reply properties into any of three games: prisoners dilemma,
coordination game, and the hawk-dove game.
44Note that x here denotes a strategy and does not refer to the level of durable good
supplied.
45The post entry payo¤s can be seen as expected payo¤s to a player, u (ex; ") and u (ey ; "),
given the post-entry population state/prole of " proportion of mutants (and (1  ") non-
mutants), or the probability that there will be "n mutants (and (1  ")n non-mutants).
Such interpretation is comparable to that in the Replicator Dynamics (RD) where the pop-
ulation state evolves. Thus, u [x; "y + (1  ")x] is the expected payo¤ of playing x, and
u [y; "y + (1  ")x] the payo¤ of playing y, when the population prole is "y + (1  ")x.
46See following section on the Replicator Dynamics on how the proportions evolve.
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to that of alternative pure or mixed strategy y for every value of ", because
each y is a best response to m. That is, there is no value of " that satises
u [m; "y + (1  ") m] > u [y; "y + (1  ") m] for min  y < m except " = 0,
or u [m; "y + (1  ") m] < u [y; "y + (1  ") m] for max  y > m except
" = 1. Thus, there is no suitable minimum " that can serve as a barrier to in-
vasions against m, which makes the mixed strategy not an ESS.
47 It is shown
in the following sections that the ESS, minand max, are asymptotically stable
in a complementary Replicator Dynamics (RD).48
3.2 The Replicator Dynamics
Suppose an anticipated shock creates uncertainty and thus triggers the dynam-
ics. That is, some rms may be able to start charging a new price by adopting
the anticipated interest. They can do so if they are able to exploit inherent
adjustment costs of human capital, so that the rms can keep producing and
supplying their durable good at a level that can (still) be absorbed by the man-
ufacturing sector. Other rms continue to adopt the same pre-shock price,
if they believe this reects the true adjustment cost of human capital. The
adjustment costs depend on the particular level of i at which HAi is able to
produce blueprints. That is, some researchers may be able to produce relatively
lower, or higher, general knowledge per blueprint, while the range of i can be
pre-determined so that the actual productivity per blueprint of all researchers
is contained within [wmin; wmax]. Thus, during transition there are two types
of pure strategies corresponding to two (pure) rm-types, where each strategy
for  has a compatible pricing strategy for durable goods, and vice-versa. De-
pending on the evolutionary game and according to the corresponding RD, the
aggregate decisions of rms may eventually lead to either a relatively more, or
less, e¤ective set of institutions.
3.2.1 Firm-level Decisions
Given rj , HYj , Ej , and j , consider the case of a negative shock - when the
pre-shockinterest cost is less than the anticipated interest cost, i.e., rj < rja.49
Note that pure strategies imply compatibility of a rm with its own researchers,
so that researchers remain within the rm. Let one pure strategy correspond
to the case when HAi believes the (relatively higher) rja should be reected in
the value of blueprints. That is, with pre-shock prot  = f
 
rj ;HYj ; Ej ; j

(calculated from equation 17), supposeHAi believes PAj should fall to

rja
. Then
this implies that at the same pre-shock wage, HAi can produce blueprints at a
47For more on invasion barriers, see Weibull (1995).
48By Hofbauer, et.al (1979), all ES states are asymptotically stable in the RD, but not
necessarily vice-versa.
49To compute for wages and prots we also need the particular values for Lj and parameters
, , and , but we take these as xed all throughout.
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new, relatively lower level (i.e. higher quality) of ja < j . In other words, let
ja be that particular level which keeps the pre-shock wage xed given the belief
of a new 

rja
, which can also be calculated using equation (16) but replacing
rj with rja. Because ja has absorbed the shock rja, there is no need or
opportunity for the rm to pass on the e¤ect of the shock to the manufacturing
sector in the form of higher mark-up on the price of the rms durable goods.
That is, ja validates 
, since the potential increase to ra is entirely o¤set by
the decrease (improvement) of j to ja. To obtain the pre-shock prot 
,
the rm thus keeps pricing its durable goods at the pre-shock price using rj (pj
from equation 6) and supplying them at the original level (xj from equation 7).
Earning the same  and pricing at rj means that the rm does not actually
lower PAj as HAi had believed, but keeps the pre-shock PAj =

rj
. Thus,
(using equation 3) the actual productivity per blueprint of HAi is now equal to
wHAj
Aj
= 

rjE
ja
j
, which is greater than the pre-shock level
wHAj
Aj
= 

rjE
j
j
, since
ja < j . Since even at this new, relatively higher, wage, the same level HYj can
still be kept in manufacturing, we can thus set the maximum wage, wmax, equal
to this, i.e. wmax = 

rjE
ja
j
. We can also break down HAis productivity per
blueprint into wmax = 

rjaE
ja
j
+


rjE
ja
j
  
rjaE
ja
j

, where we can dene the
rst term as wmin, or the minimum amount that HAi can earn should it move
out of its current rm, while the di¤erence in brackets is the amount that goes
to HAis e¤ortsto improve institutional quality. Note that wmin =

rjaE
ja
j
is
also equal to the pre-shock wage
wHAj
Aj
= 

rjE
j
j
since ja is the exact amount
that keeps
wHAj
Aj
xed given rja.50
The other pure strategy, on the other hand, corresponds to the case when
HAi believes that the true price of blueprints should remain at its pre-shock
value PAj =

rj
. There is thus no need for HAi to change j in order to keep
earning the pre-shock wage. However, in this case, the rm, while keeping
pre-shock wage xed and thus preventing any movement in human capital, can
pass on the shock to the manufacturing sector by adopting the new price pja
(computed from equation 6 using rja) for its durable goods, and supplying at a
new level xja (computed from equation 7 using rja). The rm can then earn
a prot level a that is higher than the pre-shock , but by also using rja to
discount its prot, the price of the blueprint remains the same as the pre-shock
level, i.e. PAj =
a
rja
= 

rj
. Its HAi earns the same wage per blueprint equal to
50Since  is constrained between 0 and 1, we only consider shocks that are not too big.
That is, the di¤erence between rja and domestic rj should not be too large as to require a
new level of  that is less than 0 or greater than 1. It is possible to show that in case of very
large shocks, the new level of  takes either 0 or 1 and any remaining e¤ectof the shock can
then be absorbed by some inter-sector movement of human capital. Such cases, however, are
not illustrated here.
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a
rjaE
j
j
; which is also equal to wmin = 

rjE
j
j
, since in this case the increase in
prot to a has entirely captured the increase of interest cost to rja. Thus, at
the same pre-shock level j , HAi is paid exactly the minimum wage it can get
if it moves out of its rm, and there is no extra compensation since HAi does
not exert extra e¤ortto improve institutional quality.
Note that with both (pure) strategies, the actual price of the blueprints re-
mains at its pre-shock value (although HAi might believe it should change). It
is as if the rm, having paid for the blueprint, commits itself to that price even
when a (anticipated) shock occurs.51 That is, because the shock is anticipated,
the rm can maintain the pre-shock price of the blueprint by choosing to ei-
ther change the price for durable goods, or change its strategy for institutional
spending by adjusting .52
Thus, let pure strategy 1 be ja, corresponding to wmax and min = 
,
while pure strategy 2 is j , corresponding to wmin and max = a. Note that
ja < j . The particular prots for the case when rj < rja can thus be captured
by payo¤ matrix Arj<rja :
Arj<rja =

 
0 a

;
which describes a coordination game. Playing ja (or wmax) always yields 

since HAi remains in the rm even when HAi demands a wage that is less than
wmax. Playing j (or wmin), on the other hand, can only yield a if the rm
(o¤ering wmin) is matched with HAi demanding only wmin. Otherwise, HAi
moves completely out of the rm, which e¤ectively cancels the rms right to
produce and supply the durable good, thereby driving actual prot down to
zero.
From the foregoing analysis, it is easy to illustrate the case of a positive
shock, or when rj > r0ja. Again, let pure strategy 1 correspond to wmax and
min, and pure strategy 2 to wmin and max, although the particular maximum
and minimum values di¤er from the rst case. The new 0ja is still calculated
as the value that keeps pre-shock wage per blueprint constant, given HAis
belief of a now relatively lower price of blueprint equal to 

r0ja
. Since rj > r0ja,
0ja > j > ja, that is, the new strategy that can challenge incumbent j is
associated with a deterioration of institutional quality. This, however, preserves
(or validates) the pre-shock prot . The alternative strategy, incumbent j ,
on the other hand, yields a new lower prot level, 0a < 
. Keeping j xed,
the rm absorbs the (positive) shock rj > r0ja by adopting the relatively lower
r0ja for its price and the discount cost of prot and earning 
0
a.
51Durable-good rms, however, can renege on any price for the durable good which it
might have promised to the manufacturing sector since there is uncertainty as to the correct
r, and hence, the correct mark-up price. That is, it can change its durable-good price since
the particular adjustment costs we have assumed are such that they prevent movement of HY
into research.
52An unanticipated shock, on the other hand, would lead to a re-pricing of blueprints. In
this case, there is an excusefor changing the price that has been paid or agreed upon since,
after all, the shock could not be anticipated.
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With pure strategy 0ja, the productivity per blueprint of HAi is lower than
the pre-shock level, i.e. 

rjE
0
ja
j
< 

r0jaE
0
ja
j
= 

rjE
j
j
. Recall that under this
strategy HAi changes the incumbent j in the belief that PAj should change.
Since PAj actually stays the same, and rj > r
0
ja, then at relatively higher 
0
ja but
xed PAj , the wage of HAi is relatively lower than the pre-shock level. Thus,
in this case, wmin = 

rjE
0
ja
j
, while wmax =
0a
r0jaE
j
j
= 

rjE
j
j
, or the pre-shock
level.53
Thus, when rj > r0ja, pure strategy 1 is now j , corresponding to wmax =
0a
r0jaE
j
j
and min = 0a, while pure strategy 2 is 
0
ja, corresponding to wmin =

rjE
0
ja
j
and max = . The prot levels that can be obtained are summarised
by payo¤ matrix Arj>r0ja :
Arj>r0ja =

0a 
0
a
0 

:
Both Arj<rja and Arj>r0ja follow the general coordination-game structure of
matrix A from section 3.1.3. That is, given the anticipated shock to the interest
cost, institutional quality may or may not change. Note, though, that we have
assigned strategy 1 as the relatively lower level of min, while strategy 2 is the
relatively higher level max. This is useful as we can then label type 1 rms
as the more competitiverms relative to type 2 rms. That is, type 1 rms,
whose human capital produce relatively more general knowledge or at a higher
qualityper type of durable good, have higher productivity than type 2 rms.54
The transitional dynamics describe the continuous play of the coordination
game described above. Given the above prole of a large enough number of rm-
players, nj = 2Nj , we can approximate the evolution of strategies as Taylor
and Jonkers (1978) deterministic RD in which pure strategies 1 and 2 are
replicated in the population according to how they perform against the average
strategy.55 Suppose, then, that v1 = n1n is the proportion of rms playing
strategy 1 and v2 = n2n the proportion playing 2. The population state V (t)
is dened as the vector V (t) = [v1 (t) ; v2 (t)], which can be seen as a mixed
strategy for the population. The expected payo¤ to pure strategy 1 when the
population is in state V (t) is u
 
e1; V

and the expected payo¤ to pure strategy
2 is u
 
e2; V

. The population average payo¤, which may be interpreted as
53The di¤erence wmax   wmin is foregone by HAi if it adopts 0ja. It is as if an additional
wmax wmin is divertedfrom HAi to rent-seeking activities so that the same previous prot
level  can be preserved at the expense of an overall glut in (ine¢ cient) institutional spending
and consequent deterioration of institutional quality. (It is additionalsince whenever  > 0,
there is already an implicit amount that goes to the environment. Recall discussion in section
2.)
54Applied to the open economy model in Desierto (2005), type 1 rms would be the more
globally-competitive rms, i.e. those that would be better able to supply to the global/regional
economy inasmuch as their durable goods have higher general, than specic, technology com-
ponent.
55We again follow Weibulls (1995) exposition.
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the payo¤ of a representative rm randomly drawn from the population is
u (V; V ) =
P
viu
 
ei; V

; i = 1; 2.
Note that since we are interested in the growth of rm-types (and not prots
per se), we can interpret the prot min as one type-1 rm, and describe a type-2
rm in terms of one type-1 rm. That is, we can divide the normalised payo¤
matrix A0 by min in order to treat payo¤s as the count of o¤springproduced,
i.e. the number of rm/prot-types that are replicated, each time a particular
strategy for  is adopted:56
ARD =

1 0
0 max minmin

:
From payo¤matrixARD, the pure payo¤s used for the RD are thus u(e1; e1) =
1 for strategy 1 (min) and u(e
2; e2) = max minmin for strategy 2 (max). Thus,
let n1 represent the number of players that can expect to breedo¤spring, or to
realise payo¤, of u
 
e1; V

.57 If the payo¤s are the incremental e¤ects of playing
the game in question(Weibull 1995), then the sub-population of players adopt-
ing strategy 1 is increased by replicating payo¤ u
 
e1; V

captured in the pop-
ulation. If reproductionis continuous, then n1 grows as: _n1 =

u
 
e1; V

n1.
Similarly, the growth of n2 is _n2 =

u
 
e2; V

n2, while the growth of n follows
_n = [u (V; V )]n. To derive the equations for growth of shares v1 and v2, we take
the time derivative of the identity n (t) vi (t) = ni (t) ; i = 1; 2: n _vi = _ni   _nvi.
Substituting the growth dynamics into the latter and dividing by n, the RD is
thus equal to:
_vi =

u
 
ei; V
  u (V; V ) vi: (18)
This relationship tells us that rm-types (or pure strategies) that earn payo¤s
greater than the average are growing, while rm-types that have payo¤s lower
than the average are decreasing. Using the normalized payo¤ matrix ARD, we
obtain:58
56Note that the RD is invariant under positive a¢ ne transformations (Weibull 1995), which
allows us to use ARD in lieu of matrix A0: ARD is a more appropriate interpretation of payo¤s
as we are concerned with the replication of strategies, not prots. Strictly, although rms
earn prots, human capital obtain payo¤s in the form of the compatiblewages. Modeling the
growth of prots would thus be misleading. Also, ARD is more suitable for our (continuous-
time) RD since prot levels can be very large, and using A can produce large (discrete)
adjustments per time period. (See Vega-Redondo 1996 for an analysis of the discrete-time
and continuous-time RDs.)
57The rmsand their human capital, being the players of the game, earn the payo¤s - the
rms in terms of prots, and human capital in terms of the corresponding wages. Thus, min
for the rm, for instance, is translated into wmax for its human capital player. (Note that
the term "rm-types" refer to all players, and are thus applied to both the rmsand their
human capital.)
58From the normalized payo¤ matrix ARD , expected payo¤s are thus u
 
e1; V

= v1 + 0v2
and u
 
e2; V

= 0v1 +

max min
min

v2. Population average payo¤ is thus u(V; V ) = v1v1 +
v2

max min
min

v2, and _v1 = u
 
e1; V
   u (V; V ) v1 = v2v1 hv1   max minmin  v2i, and
_v2 = u
 
e2; V
   u (V; V ) v1 = v2v1 hmax minmin  v2   v1i, since the sum of the population
shares necessarily equals one: (1  v1) = v2.
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_v1 =

v1  

max   min
min

v2

v1v2; (18a)
_v2 =

max   min
min

v2   v1

v1v2: (18b)
It can be seen from equation (18a) that _v1 changes signs when v1 =

max min
min

v2,
i.e., at the mixed-strategy N.E. v1 = max minmax . This means that for an initial
proportion of rms adopting min that is equal to v
0
1 <
max min
max
, v1 decreases
to zero (while v2 increases to one), but for a large enough initial proportion v01 >
max min
max
, the population share v1 grows towards one (while v2 declines to zero).
Depending on the initial proportions adopting either strategy, the asymptoti-
cally stable strategy is either min or max.Thus, the population state converges
to either of the two possible ES strategies discussed in the previous section.
Indeed, if, for example, min becomes the evolutionarily stable strategy, then by
Hofbauer, et. al. (1979), it should have also satised the RD. It can be seen that
if min satises u [min; "max + (1  ") min] > u [max; "max + (1  ") min],
that is, if there is a minimum proportion of non-mutants,(1  "), or a maximum
proportion of mutants, ", with which the latter inequality holds, then min
necessarily satises u (emin ; V ) > u (emax ; V ), since v1 = (1  v2)  (1  ").59
Equation (18) also provides the rmsspeed of learningthe correctstrat-
egy, which is decreasing as the expected payo¤ to adopting the correct strategy
approaches the population average payo¤. That is, the rate of adjustment is
higher near the onset of the shock, and tapers o¤ as the new steady state
is reached. In addition, it can be shown that the larger the absolute valuev01   max minmax , the faster the system approaches the steady state.60
3.2.2 Aggregate Growth
59u (emin ; V ) > u (emax ; V ) implies asymptotic stability of min in the RD, since in this
case, u (emin ; V ) is necessarily greater than, and u (emax ; V ) less than, the average of the
two expected payo¤s.
60See ch. 2 of Desierto (2005) for simulations, where di¤erent initial values of proportions
have been assumed. While we have not explicitly done so, it may be interesting to test
for possible determinants of v01 . Note, also, that the RDs (18a) and (18b) may be seen as
continuous-time approximations of discrete adjustments. First of all, each drawor pair-wise
matching reects adjustment periods, or how often strategies on wages, price and prots are
reviewed, i.e. annually, monthly, weekly etc. Secondly, recall that playing the game may entail
re-organisationof the rm and/or the intra-sector movement of researchers when strategies
do not match. In reality this can be subject to inherent rigidities, making each draw or
pair-wise matching to be few and far between so as to render the game more discrete than
continuous. Vega-Redondo (1996) provides a discrete-time version of the RD: vi(t+1) vi(t) =
[u(ei;V ) u(V;V )]vi
u(V;V )
, which may be more appropriate, if we let t denote adjustment periods.
Thus, depending on review rates and intra-sector mobility, it can take a very long time for
the system to stabilise.
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In computing the growth rate of output Yj during the transition, note that both
knowledge Aj and level xj at which durable goods are supplied are now evolving
at rates that are inuenced by the RD. This is because there is a proportion
of rms, v1, that produce new knowledge with a greater general, relative to
specic, component, i.e. at min, and a proportion, v2, that produce at the
mix max. While in the steady state, all rms share all knowledge, the tran-
sition reveals heterogeneity in human capital productivity which dichotomises
the research/durable good sector. The total stock of knowledge produced by all
rms is now Aj = v1A1 + v2A2, where A1 refers to knowledge that is produced
by type-1 rms using the mix min, while A2 is knowledge produced by type-2
rms using max. Thus, while all researchers still share the same environment,
the types of technology produced now di¤er between sub-sectors. Although at
rst glance it seems that the spillover e¤ects of technology are curtailed in that
A1 6= A2, note that there is a positive externality generated as v1 increases.
That is, rms that initiate e¤orts to improve (or keep a relatively higher) insti-
tutional quality bear the greatest uncertainty of earning relatively lower prots
while, assuming there is su¢ cient momentum, i.e. v1 > mixed N:E:, the re-
maining uncertainty decreases for the other rms as expected payo¤ approaches
pure payo¤ of strategy 1, making it easierfor other rms to follow. In other
words, it is as if rms free-rideon the initiatorse¤orts.61 Thus, while the
quantity of technology may initially decrease with dichotimisation, its quality
can improve (along with the quantity of the higher-quality type A1), thereby
increasing aggregate Aj .
Durable goods are now also supplied at two levels. The proportion v1 that
uses the relatively lower mark-up for the price of its durable goods supply at
a higher level, x1, while the v2 proportion of rms use the relatively higher
mark-up and supply at the lower level, x2. Since there is only one manufac-
turing sector, the aggregate level of durable good that is absorbed by the
manufacturing sector is the average xj = v1x1 + v2x2.62 Output during the
pre-integration transition is thus:
Yj = H

YjL

j [v1tA1 + v2tA2] [v1tx1 + v2tx2]
1  
: (19)
Recall that in the steady state
_Yj
Yj
=
_Aj
Aj
which is also equal to the growth rate
of capital Kj . During transition, however:
_Yj
Yj
=
_Aj
Aj
+
(1    ) _xj
xj
; (20)
while Kj = Ajxj grows at the rate:
61Recall that the RD is fastest at the beginning, and tapers o¤ as it reaches the steady
state.
62However, as seen in Desierto (2005), if markets open up to the global economy, there may
eventually be two distinct manufacturing sectors, a domestic sector that uses only domestic
durable goods (and produces only domestic goods), and a global sector using global durable
goods (and manufactures for the global market). Similarly, there may be a domestic, and a
global, research/durable good sector.
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_Kj
Kj
=
_Aj
Aj
+
_xj
xj
; (21)
where
_Aj =
v1HAjA1
E
min
j
+ _v1A1 +
v2HAjA2
E
max
j
+ _v2A2; (22)
_xj =
"
(1    )2HYjLj
min (rj ; rG)
# 1
+
_v1 +
"
(1    )2HYjLj
max (rj ; rG)
# 1
+
_v2; (23)
and the RDs are given by equations (18a) and (18b).
It is seen here that capital grows at a di¤erent rate than output; that is,
capital accumulation is either slower, or more rapid, during transition, until it
eventually increases or slows down to reach its steady state growth. (Note that
in the steady state when either _v1 or _v2 equals zero, _x = 0, and only continuous
technological change can sustain further growth.) The intuition behind this lies
in the feature that whenever institutional quality evolves, not only does the
quantity of the types of durable goods (A) increases, but the qualityof each
type evolves as well, allowing the level x at which durable goods are supplied
to change. For instance, a higher quality-type A1 allowsthe rm to supply
the durable good at a higher level (using a relatively lower interest cost and
mark-up price). During adjustments toward the steady state, we make explicit
an additional function of human capital - that of determining the relative mix
of general and country-specic knowledge in every blueprint and durable good
produced. That is, human capital does not only produce more durable goods,
they do so with relatively higher or lower general knowledge component, which
enables rms to supply durable goods at di¤erent qualities. Because of this ex-
trafunction of human capital during transition, there is unbalancedgrowth.
As the correctstrategy for  is learnt by all rms, this becomes a convention
(an ESS) and eventually becomes xed in the steady state, and the produc-
tivity of human capital will then only pertain to the continuous production of
blueprints, at a constant mix of (xed) .
It can also be seen that a path leading to min (when v1 = 1 and n1 = 2N ,
and v2 = 0 and n2 = 0) leads to a relatively higher growth of Aj , and a
relatively higher level of xj , in the steady state. Note, however, that such a
path is associated with a relatively lower level of prots, i.e. min. Higher
output growth can thus be achieved even at the expense of durable-good rm
prots. This should be intuitively clear, as rms that improve institutional
quality absorb more of the negative shock (or forego benets from a positive
shock) than rms who do not. That is, as noted earlier, it is as if rms that
take longer to adjust to min free-rideon the initiating rmse¤orts, or to put
it another way, initiating rms produce (positive) externalities for the aggregate
economy. The larger the total initial e¤ort (to improve institutional quality)
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or initial sacriceof prots, the greater the external benets generated, and
the larger and faster the increase in aggregate output.63
4 Interpretation
The evolution into more, or less, e¤ective institutions can thus be shown as a
continuous (evolutionary) game between rms (existing and potential, i.e. the
rms that researchers can form if they move out of their current rm), which
eventually determines the type of rm and corresponding strategy that can
survive. The game is essentially one of coordination, with better institutions
associated with lower level of prots (implying lower interest/transaction cost)
but higher wage of researchers, and less e¤ective institutions with higher prots
(implying higher interest/transaction cost) but with lower wage. Anticipated
changes in the interest cost trigger the game by allowing rms to either maintain
the previous level of institutional quality and let the interest cost (and mark-up
price and prots) change, or change institutional quality to prevent the change
in the interest cost. The latter adaptiveresponse requires an improvement
in institutional quality when the anticipated shock is negative, but allowsa
worsening of institutional quality when the shock is positive.
Both strategies are evolutionarily stable. That is, rms that initiate an up-
grade into (or keep) better institutions can succeed in pulling the rest of the
rms into adopting the same strategy and similarly, e¤orts that lead to a de-
terioration (or non-improvement) of institutions can spread into the aggregate.
The potential direction and magnitude of the change is determined by the type
of the shock, while the success of the corresponding strategies depends on the
initial e¤orts of (initiating) rms. If the proportion of initiating rms is large
enough, then the expected prots of adopting their strategy is larger than the
expected prots from not following, which then eventually convincesall rms
(and their researchers) of the correctness of the strategy.64 When rms antici-
pate an increase in the interest cost (rj < ra), they can initiate e¤orts to improve
institutions to stay relatively competitive by essentially raising the productivity
of their researchers. It is as if the extra compensation to researchers goes to
e¤orts to keep interest/transactions costs at the relatively lower level rj .65 This
63This is demonstrated in the simulation results in Desierto (2005).
64This expectedpayo¤ interpretation, in which as if a rm surveys the eldto compute for
the population average payo¤ and compares this to the pure strategiesexpected payo¤s, yields
the same results as in our pair-wise interpretation where each rm pits its strategy against
that of its pair. (It is then as if the rm tests the pure strategy against the mixed strategy
corresponding to the population state.) In the aggregate, the dynamics (still) prescribes that
the replicator (or pure strategy) that yields a payo¤ greater than the average grows. (See
Weibull 1995.) For an alternative playing-the-eld setup of a pair-wise game, see Vega-
Redondo (1996).
65That is, human capital may be compensated for additional e¤orts spent on, for example,
initiating changes in nancial institutions (e.g. the venture capital innovation), or on lobbying
for certain laws (e.g. anti-piracy laws and stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights),
which can ultimately lower transaction costs for all technology rms. Firms can also spend
on relocating into concentrated clusters of research/durable-good rms (to keep the factor
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would allow the rms to price their durable goods at a relatively lower, more
competitive, price.
On the other hand, if rms anticipate a decrease in the interest cost (rj > ra),
then some rms may actually initiate e¤orts that lead to a deterioration in in-
stitutions by divertingsome of the intended compensation of human capital in
order to keep the (relatively higher) interest cost rj and price, thereby keeping
the relatively higher prots. That is, bad institutions incur higher transac-
tions costs for the rm, which the latter can then pass on to its buyers (the
manufacturing sector), and this can give rms the incentive to keep institutions
relatively ine¤ective.66 It is as if these rms become complacentthat they will
still be able to supply in the economy since they believe/anticipate that interest
costs will decrease. (However, if all other rms do the same, then the interest
cost will not decrease to ra but instead remain at rj .)
Note that the possibility of evolution of institutional quality relies on the
assumption of asymmetric mobility of human capital.67 That is, if inter-sector
movement is more costly than the cost of moving from one research rm to
another, then human capital, while kept within the research/durable good sec-
tor, has the opportunity to change the quality of the blueprints they produce
in anticipation of a shock. To put it in another way, the anticipated shock
can induce some uncertainty as to the true productivity of researchers, which
can thus present an opportunity for rms to learn their productivity in the
aggregate.
Thus, there are two types of learning involved in the transition dynamics.
That is, while the quantity of blueprints increase, their quality also changes
as institutional quality evolves.68 This (transitional) co-evolution of knowledge
and institutions is what drives the growth of aggregate output during this out-of-
steady state version of the Romer (1990) model. In this alternative framework,
rms not only increase the number of (domestic) blueprints, but they also learn
the correct mix (of general and specic components) at which each blueprint
should be produced, which reects the true stablequality of institutions. The
more e¤ective institutions become, the more general the blueprints and the
more readily it is absorbed without having to produce more country-specic
knowledge in order to adapt to the environment. Thus, in this case, technology-
creation is faster and output growth is higher.
intensity of the shared environment low), as exemplied by Silicon Valley.
66Such rms may then pursue excessive rent-seeking by, for example, lobbying for protec-
tionist laws, or engaging in corruptand bureaucratic practices that can undermine rights and
patents over blueprints, in order to justify the higher transactions cost which they e¤ectively
face. That is, instead of raising human capital productivity, such rms may want to protect
prots.
67The presence of large wage inequalities in transition and developing economies, and during
increased economic integration, may be telling. However, note that the relevant wages would
be those of skilled labour, i.e. those engaged in innovation and those alternatively employed
in high-level managerial positions. In this respect, large wage inequalities between skilled and
un-skilled workers do not necessarily indicate drastic changes in institutional quality, although
they can hasten the evolution (into relatively better, or worse, institutions).
68Note that the higher the quality of institutions, the higher the quality of the blueprints.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have extended the Romer (1990) model to account for (en-
dogenous) institutional change and explained transitional dynamics towards the
steady state by modeling the co-evolution of institutions and technology. We
have also been able to show knowledge-creation as both increases in the types
of goods and improvements in quality. That is, during transitions, (monopoly)
prots can be continuously eroded, as institutions become more e¤ective, so that
the (aggregate) quality of blueprints can continuously increase. At the steady
state, when there is a xed level of institutional quality, all rms face the same
xed interest cost and earn the same prot level. Hence, output growth can
now only rely on the increase in the number of types of (durable) goods that
are available at the same quality.
Note that the change in institutional quality is triggered by an anticipated
change in the interest cost. If the interest cost were to change unexpectedly,
then no rm would be able to anticipate. It is as if all players would simulta-
neously make the mistake of not changing the level of . All the rmswages
would equally decrease or increase, thus prompting inter-sector movements of
human capital (between manufacturing and research) until the new equilibrium
is reached. Other unanticipated shocks, such as changes in the level of total
human capital, and the environment, could also a¤ect equilibrium productivity
and wages. Such dynamics, however, have not been analysed in this paper.
Although we have only considered singular shocks, the transition dynamics
proposed here could be easily applicable to multiple shocks. If the shocks oc-
curred simultaneously, the dimensions of the bi-matrix game could be extended,
such that there could be more than one anticipated interest cost, or to preserve
the bi-matrix framework, an averageanticipated interest cost could be calcu-
lated which could capture the averageanticipated e¤ect of the shock. On the
other hand, if shocks occurred one at a time, they could be treated as di¤erent
games. However, note that once the economy starts the proposed Replicator
Dynamics, it remains in transition, since the steady state is reached only as-
ymptotically. Thus, the current evolutionary game could still be playing out
when and if another shock occurred. One way to resolve this is to terminate the
current, and start a new, RD if it could be assumed that the particular source
of uncertainty disappears once a new shock hits the economy (and a new source
of uncertainty is identied). In another paper (Desierto (2005)) we provide an
example of this, where economic integration is modeled as a two-stage Replica-
tor Dynamics, the rst-stage being triggered by the anticipation of opening up
of markets and is terminated once the economy is actually opened. A second-
stage (multi-population) RD follows, in which the new source of uncertainty
is the actual global interest cost that will prevail with the participation of the
entrant economy in the new integrated region.
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